France Invest
Making human rights due diligence a legal requirement for companies including systems to identify, assess, mitigate or manage human rights risks and impacts to improve that process over time and to disclose the risks and impacts, the steps taken and the results.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity is in favour of a legal framework agreement, broadly agrees with due diligence duty defintion, and advocates for an horizontal approach.
As per its response to question 2, the entity is in favour of an EU legal framework for supply chain due diligence. It broadly agrees with the definition of due diligence duty, as per question 14. This definition includes a due diligence process aimed at preventing, mitigating, and accounting for human rights impacts both in the entity’s own operations and throughout the supply chain. The entity advocates for a minimum process- and definitions-based approach regarding the content of the due diligence duty (question 15).
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity welcomes the introduction of this Directive and the development of a legal framework for corporate due diligence on human rights.
The entity states that: ‘France Invest welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and the development of an EU legal framework for corporate due diligence to address adverse impacts on human rights and environmental issues …. We support the Commission’s aim to improve corporate sustainability and legal certainty, avoid fragmentation of the Single market and ensure a level playing field for market players. This will also contribute to the quality of EU companies, their reputation and brand image, … This being said, the introduction of an EU framework for corporate sustainability due diligence should not increase administrative costs and procedural burden, penalise smaller companies with fewer resources, or place responsibility on EU companies for damages that they cannot control.'
Requiring Human rights due diligence of all companies, regardless of sector and size, while still reflecting their individual circumstances.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity advocates for a framework that applies to all companies although it also consdiers that companies with less than 50 employees should be excluded. It is in favour of an horizontal approach, covering all sectors.
The entity states that 'it is crucial that any new EU initiative should embed the proportionality principle, i.e. it should apply to all companies, but with lighter minimum requirements for SMEs, including SMEs backed by private equity and venture capital fund managers. Proportionality should be assessed on the basis of size, capabilities and risk exposures, and resource availability. It is crucial to recognise that smaller companies may have limited supply chain options and limited scope to orchestrate change.' However, through a multiple-choice response, it expresses support for excluding 'micro and small-sized enterprises (less than 50 employees)', as indicated in its answer to question 16.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity states that a duty of care in terms of sustainability, 'must remain a voluntary act for SMEs.'
The entity states that: 'we appreciate the additional time granted to smaller market players to comply with the new rules, through a phased implementation. In addition, we support a full application of the proportionality principle, for instance through the introduction of thresholds or lighter requirements for smaller companies. In any case, a duty of care in terms of sustainability must remain a voluntary act for SMEs so as not to penalize them given their lesser resources. It should be noted that, even if SMEs are not directly in the scope of the Directive, they will be indirectly impacted by the new rules: SMEs included in a value chain will be mechanically affected and thus have to report at the request of their partners. In this context, we call for supporting measures for SMEs to be more clearly defined. Most importantly, we would like to make clear that lighter requirements also apply to SMEs backed by private equity and venture capital funds.’ It also states that: 'we welcome that SMEs are kept out of the scope of the proposed Directive.'
Implementing an enforcement mechanism where companies fail to carry out due diligence as described.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity is in favour of supervision by national authorities based upon complaints about non-compliance with setting up and implementing due diligence with effective sections, with a mechanism of EU coordination to ensure consistency.
As per its response to question 19a on enforcement mechanisms, the entity selects the option (multiple choice) of supervision by competent national authorities based on complaints (and/or reporting, where relevant) about non-compliance with setting up and implementing due diligence measures, etc. with effective sanctions (such as for example fines), complemented with a mechanism of EU cooperation/coordination to ensure consistency throughout the EU.
Including in the duties of directors and company law obligations to avoid human rights impacts or “harms”.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The Company disagrees with including in the duties of directors obligation to have procedures to ensure that possible risks and adverse impacts on stakeholders are identified, prevented and addressed.
It disagrees 'to some extent' with question 7, and states that 'We do not support any legal obligation for corporate directors to set up procedures and measurable targets to ensure that possible risks and adverse impacts on stakeholders are identified, prevented and addressed. Indeed, corporate directors are not responsible for settings procedures, it is the role of the management of the company. Furthermore, given the variety of size, activity and geographical scope of European companies, any new EU initiative should allow companies complete flexibility to decide whether and which procedures and targets in this area are appropriate to their business'. Also, although it consdiers that companies should idneitfy relevant stakeholders and their risks in order to take actions to address them, it seems to disagree with making this a requirement, as per question 6, stating that '. It should be recalled that companies may have a myriad of stakeholders who may be impacted directly or indirectly by their activities (including positive impacts). Moreover, certain stakeholders’ interests will necessarily be contradictory with others. Therefore a “one size fits all” model is not adapted to cope with this objective. Without a focus on salience and the most significant risks, companies’ responses may lack focus and be contradictory. In particular, we find it very worrying that it is unclear whether stakeholders' interests would be weighted equally with those of shareholders and, if so, how directors are expected to resolve conflicts between various stakeholder and shareholder constituencies. In any case, companies should not be held responsible for decisions and behaviour of third parties (e.g. suppliers and/or subcontractors) along the whole value chain'.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity considers that the Directive should not lead to personal liability for directors and managers and that having to take into account a wide range of externalities for different stakeholders, with no clear prioritisation, would muddy responsibilities for creating long-term value for the company.
The entity states that: 'The proposed Directive should not lead to personal liability for directors and managers with respect to the impacts of the company on its stakeholders. Directors owe fiduciary duties to the company itself and not to third parties'. It also indicates that 'in this value creation investment, various stakeholders and other externalities are already today being taken into account, as they have an important impact on the performance of the company. Having to take into account a wide range of all different kinds of externalities, stakeholders and civil society organisations with no clear prioritization, and with the risk of being held personally accountable, will undoubtedly dilute and hamper the directors’ responsibilities for creating real, long-term value for the company. We find it sensible that companies can be held liable for their own adverse impacts in relation to the environment and human rights. However, we would like to underline the importance of the liability laying with the company itself and not the directors personally. It should be clarified to whom a director can be liable, under which conditions, under which jurisdiction.'
Require companies to provide grievance mechanisms for all stakeholders including those in the value chain.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity does not respond to the question of whether complaint mechanisms as part of due diligence should be promoted at the EU level. However, it strongly disagrees with the legal requirement of establishing mechanisms and consultation channels for engaging with stakeholders.
It does not respond to question 20c on grievance mechanisms. However, it strongly disagrees with question 20a on a requirement to establish consultation mechanisms. It states that: 'In our opinion, there should be no legal requirement at EU level regarding the definition of the scope of a company’s stakeholders and how dialogue between them should be organised.'
Enabling judicial enforcement with liability and compensation in case of harm caused by not fulfilling the due diligence obligations.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The Company doesn't consider this a suitable option as enforcement mechanism.
Question 19a asks about enforcement mechanisms through a multiple-choice format, one of which is 'judicial enforcement with liability and compensation in case of harm caused by not fulfilling the due diligence obligations'. The company did not select this as one of its preferred measures.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity supports civil liability under certain conditions.
The entity states that: ‘We support the approach of the Commission to recognize only the direct civil liability of companies and its effort to integrate in the assessment of civil liability the measures that have been put in place by companies to meet the required obligations. … We would however like to warn the Commission against any potential unintended consequences of such liability regime on SMEs. Indeed, we are concerned that larger market players may transfer some of their responsibility or possible sanctions onto smaller players in their value chain. We are concerned that companies may be liable to a disproportionate accumulation of possible sanctions, as the regime established by the proposed Directive is without prejudice to EU and national rules on civil liability concerning situations which are not covered by the Directive and/or stricter liability than that provided for in the Directive.’
Require companies to implement a due diligence process covering their value chain to identify, prevent, mitigate and remediate human rights impacts and improve that practice over time.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity broadly agrees with due diligence definition, although it consideres that value chain should refer to first-tier contractors and suppliers.
In its response to question 14, on whether the entity agrees with due diligence duty definition, it states: 'We broadly agree with the proposed definition. We believe that the duty of due diligence should focus on the activities on which companies have a reasonable level of control, i.e. the company’s own operations, the activities of the companies it controls and of its first-tier contractors and suppliers. It would not be appropriate to cover the whole value chain, because that would disproportionately expose companies to liability, for acts over which they have no control, including for how their products are used. More generally … in a context of (post) health crisis, companies - in particular small companies – may be fragile and should not be overburden by additional obligations. They should be given some time to recover before they can adapt to and comply with new requirements'. The entity does not refer to improvement or remedy in its response to the consultation document.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity considers that due diligence duty should focus on one's own operations, the activities of the companies it controls and of its first-tier contractors and suppliers. Although it does not oppose remedy, it warns against cumulative effect.
The entity states that: ‘We believe that it is not appropriate to cover the whole value chain (upstream and downstream), as this would disproportionately expose companies to liability, for acts over which they have no control, including for how their products are used. It should be noted that companies in the distribution chain are not necessarily contractually tied with the company subject to the obligation of due diligence. Companies should not be held responsible for decisions and behaviour of third parties (e.g. suppliers and/or subcontractors) along the whole value chain. In other words, we suggest restricting due diligence obligations to direct relationships in the upstream part of the value chain.’ It also points out that: ‘We would like to underline that, cumulatively, remedy actions (investments, suspension or termination of the business relationship…) and sanctions (pecuniary compensations, absence of public support…) may place a heavy weight on companies.’ It does not refer to improvement over time.
Require that companies implement contract clauses and Code of Conduct with business partners clarifying obligations to avoid and to address human rights harms.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity is against full value chain due diligence and obliging business partners to respect the code of conduct, as it places SMEs in a very uncertain situation of subordination.
The entity states that: 'We believe that obliging business partners to respect the company's code of conduct places SMEs in a very uncertain situation of subordination. Moreover, requiring large companies to provide financial support to SMEs risks directing the former towards larger partners for whom they will have no costs to incur.' The entity goes on to say: 'We believe that it is not appropriate to cover the whole value chain (upstream and downstream), as this would disproportionately expose companies to liability, for acts over which they have no control, including for how their products are used.'
Require that companies identify their stakeholders and their interests.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity disagrees to some extent with it being legally required to identify their stakeholders and their interests. Although it considers some affected stakeholders as relevant, it does not take a position in relation to others.
More specifically, in its explanation of the response to question 6, it states: 'Regarding the identification of the company’s stakeholders and their interests, it is crucial that each company remains free to determine which stakeholders are most relevant to its activities and decides the best ways to organize dialogue with such stakeholders. ... In our opinion, companies should identify the most relevant stakeholders and the most salient risks in order to implement actions to address those salient risks in priority ... Any EU initiative requiring companies to carry out an overview of stakeholders’ interests should be flexible enough to reflect the specificity of each company's own environment and activities. It should be recalled that companies may have a myriad of stakeholders who may be impacted directly or indirectly by their activities (including positive impacts). Moreover, certain stakeholders’ interests will necessarily be contradictory with others. Therefore a “one size fits all” model is not adapted to cope with this objective.' In addition, it does not take a position on the relevance of some stakeholders, including employees and communities in the supply chain nor communities in companies own operations.
Require directors to establish and apply mechanisms or, where they already exist for employees for example, use existing information and consultation channels for engaging with stakeholders.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity strongly disagrees with the legal requirement for directors to establish mechanisms and consultation channels for engaging with stakeholders.
The entity strongly disagrees with question 20 which asks about the requirement of this indicator. It states that: '‘In our opinion, there should be no legal requirement at EU level regarding the definition of the scope of a company’s stakeholders and how dialogue between them should be organised. For example, employees occupy a specific and fundamental position in the company, which justifies important rights of information and consultation. … Other categories of stakeholders will require different levels and types of information. Depending on the size and on the level of decentralization of the company considered, dialogue may be set at local, regional, national, European or international level. Moreover, in practice, companies may not be able to carry out an exhaustive overview of all their stakeholders’ interests. They can only identify the most relevant stakeholders and prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts. In addition, it may be impossible to balance the interests of all the company’s stakeholders, especially in sectors where companies have a myriad of stakeholders. Activities which may have a highly positive impact on one set of stakeholders, or even be crucial for their human rights, could have negative impacts on others."
Require that corporate directors should manage the human rights risks for the company in relation to stakeholders and their interest including on the long run.
Direct Consultation with Governments
Comments from the entity submitted through official regulatory and legislative consultation processes, or via meetings and other direct engagements with policymakers. Includes evidence obtained by InfluenceMap through Freedom of Information requests.
The entity states that it disagrees to some extent to the question of directors being required by law to manage the risks for the company in relation to stakeholders and their interests, including in the long run.
More specifically, in its explanation of the response to question 6 it states that: 'We would like to underline that the identification and management of stakeholders’ interests should be performed by the company’s management. Indeed, the company’s supervisory bodies are not well placed to identify and manage stakeholders’ interests. ... the company’s management is in charge of the operation of the company, whereas the company’s supervisory bodies are primarily responsible for defining the company’s strategy and/or controlling the management. As a consequence, we believe that the company’s management is in a better position to identify and manage these issues.In our opinion, companies should identify the most relevant stakeholders and the most salient risks in order to implement actions to address those salient risks in priority, including preventing, mitigating and accounting for how they address their potential impacts. Any EU initiative requiring companies to carry out an overview of stakeholders’ interests should be flexible enough to reflect the specificity of each company's own environment and activities. It should be recalled that companies may have a myriad of stakeholders who may be impacted directly or indirectly by their activities (including positive impacts). Moreover, certain stakeholders’ interests will necessarily be contradictory with others. Therefore a “one size fits all” model is not adapted to cope with this objective. Without a focus on salience and the most significant risks, companies’ responses may lack focus and be contradictory. In particular, we find it very worrying that it is unclear whether stakeholders' interests would be weighted equally with those of shareholders and, if so, how directors are expected to resolve conflicts between various stakeholder and shareholder constituencies.' Finally, it concludes with: 'Any new EU initiative should not lead to personal legal liability for directors and managers with respect to company’s impacts on stakeholders. It is a long-standing principle of company law that directors hold fiduciary duties to the company itself and not to third parties. Any liability for failing in relation to a company’s activities should be borne by the company itself and not its directors.'
| Legislation | Phase of Active Company Engagement | Position |
|---|
| Member | Performance band |
|---|---|
| Allianz SE | E |
| Blackrock | D- |
| Caisse des Dépôts Group | C- |
| MAIF | C+ |
| Mazars | B- |
| Mirova | C+ |
