Making human rights due diligence a legal requirement for companies including systems to identify, assess, mitigate or manage human rights risks and impacts to improve that process over time and to disclose the risks and impacts, the steps taken and the results.
The entity welcomes the Directive in general terms but conditions its support on 'practical and proportionate design', and argues for further definitional clarity throughout.
It states that '(BDSI) therefore welcomes the proposal for an EU Directive on corporate due diligence with regard to sustainability ... However, for the German confectionery industry, the practical and proportionate design of the proposed regulation is indispensable.'
The entity is in favour of a legal framework for human rights due diligence.
It states that 'The Association of the German Confectionery Industry (BDSI) supports an EU-wide due diligence approach based on the UN Guiding Principles as well as a comprehensive EU strategy with the aim of creating the preconditions needed to make progress in establishing sustainable agriculture'.
The entity supports an EU-level due diligence strategy aligned with the UNGPs.
The entity states that 'The BDSI supports an EU-wide due diligence approach based on the UN Guiding Principles as well as a comprehensive EU strategy with the aim of creating the preconditions needed to make progress in establishing sustainable agriculture. National governments in the producing countries must enforce and strengthen their national labour laws'. It also points out that 'A holistic approach is needed to achieve the respect and observance of human rights in supply chains. A possible European regulation, similar to the EU Timber Regulation, must be flanked by employing the instrument of Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs)'.
Requiring Human rights due diligence of all companies, regardless of sector and size, while still reflecting their individual circumstances..
Although it does not address the scope of companies explicitly, the entity stresses SME dependency on certifications, implying SMEs should not face the same obligations as large companies.
It states that 'In particular, small and medium-sized enterprises, which do not have a direct influence on the entire supply chain, rely on their suppliers and on trustworthy certification'.
The entity is in favour of an horizontal approach. However, it considers that all SMEs should be excluded
The entity states that 'SMEs and mid-sized companies must be excluded from any mandatory due diligence obligations. The European Commission should follow a “think small first”-approach. SMEs are the backbone of Europe’s economy. Their restricted possibilities must be duly taken into account'. On the other hand, it advoces for a horizontal, principles-based approach, as indicated in response to question 15.
The entity stresses that medium-sized companies cannot be expected to compensate for state-level human rights failings, and calls for proxies to due diligence
The entity points out that ‘There are insufficient state controls or violations are not prosecuted. For mostly medium- sized confectionery companies in Germany, it is not possible in practice to correct government deficits, e.g. in cocoa-growing regions in West Africa’. In relation to this, it indicates that ‘When companies source certified sustainable raw materials whose standards require compliance with human rights and environmental due diligence, they must be able to rely on the respective certification process. Especially small and medium-sized enterprises depending on the assurances given in these certificates’. It also notes that ‘In many cases it must be sufficient for the food manufacturer to contractually obligate its suppliers of raw materials or processed raw materials to meet the requirements of compliance with human rights due diligence. Otherwise the sourcing of raw materials, especially for medium-sized companies, will not be manageable in practice’.
Implementing an enforcement mechanism where companies fail to carry out due diligence as described.
The entity advocates for supervision by national authorities based con complaints about non-compliance with setting up and implementing due diligence with effective sections, with a mechanism of EU coordination to ensure consistency.
It also states (question 19a) that 'As per the UNGPs, companies should be required to embed respect for human rights into policies and broader corporate systems, undertake ongoing human rights due diligence processes and implement effective grievance mechanisms to help address impacts early and remediate them as appropriate. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the respective upstream stage should, in principle, be the first to be made accountable. (…) Upstream suppliers operating in the producing countries are represented locally, are in direct contact with the farmers or their cooperatives, and can therefore act more quickly and in a more targeted manner. However, the transfer of accountability necessarily means that the companies must check the upstream suppliers accordingly and react immediately if they become aware of incidents’.
Including in the duties of directors and company law obligations to avoid human rights impacts or “harms”.
The entity disagrees 'to some extent' with a legal requirement for directors to establish procedures to ensure that possible risks and advese impacts on stakeholders are identified, prevented and addressed, and strongly disagrees with a requirment to manage the risks for companies in relation to stakeholders and their interests.
The entity disagrees ‘to some extent’ with question 7 regarding directors’ duty to have procedures to ensure risks are identified, prevented and addressed, and puts the focus on directors’ duties: ‘The basic duties of the board of directors are to be regulated by law and are regulated everywhere by law. However, detailed specifications and compliance procedures may not be laid down by the legislator, as these depend very much on the specific need of the companies and the requirements vary greatly depending on the industry and the purpose of the company. General legal requirements would therefore only lead to additional bureaucracy’. In addition, the entity strongly disagrees with question 6 on directors’ requirement to manage the risks in relation to stakeholders, arguing that ‘it is not reasonable to believe that companies can carry out an exhaustive overview of all their stakeholders’ interests. There is no definition behind “stakeholders” and no reasonable definition can be found due to the specificity of each company's environment. We strongly believe that any legal consequences attached to this notion would be highly problematic and hazardous for companies.
Require companies to provide grievance mechanisms for all stakeholders including those in the value chain.
The entity does not respond to the question that directly asks about complaint mechanisms, but strongly disagrees with a requirement to establish mechanisms for stakeholder consultation as part of due diligence duty.
The entity did not respond to the question that directly addresses complaint mechanisms. However, it strongly disagrees with a requirement (for directors) to establish mechanisms for stakeholder consultation as part of due diligence duty. It states that '‘There exists already EU-regulation on the information and consultation of workers. Further new regulations are not needed. We recognise that consultation of relevant stakeholders is important in the life of companies, but it should be up to the company itself to define which stakeholders are relevant. Companies already organise the dialogue with their stakeholders using different mechanisms that are suitable to the intended goals (…) Also, new legal requirements risk destabilising or duplicating existing effective provisions. Involvement/ consultation/ information to relevant stakeholders is important, but should be determined by the company, depending on its specificities. Legally mandated mechanisms could lead to either meaningless box-ticking exercises or to conflicting situations (between different stakeholders’ interests) that would reduce efficiency of decision-making processes in companies and harm their competitiveness’.
Enabling judicial enforcement with liability and compensation in case of harm caused by not fulfilling the due diligence obligations.
The entity explicitly rejects civil liability beyond existing rules, framing it as disproportionate and contradictory to the UNGPs.
The entity indicates that 'We reject as disproportionate a liability on the part of companies, which goes beyond existing rules. This is not fully controlled by the risk to businesses and is in clear contradiction with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which preclude risk shifting to companies'.
The entity doesn't consider this a suitable option as enforcement mechanism.
Question 19a asks about enforcement mechanisms through a multiple-choice format, one of which is 'judicial enforcement with liability and compensation in case of harm caused by not fulfilling the due diligence obligations'. The company did not select this as one of its preferred measures.
Require companies to implement a due diligence process covering their value chain to identify, prevent, mitigate and remediate human rights impacts and improve that practice over time.
The entity opposes full extension of DD obligations to the entire supply chain, endorsing the German model as a template.
It states that 'We are not in favour of a full extension to the entire supply chain. The German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act is pragmatic and can serve as a template for the EU Directive. The focus on its own business area and the direct supplier, and an extension to the indirect supplier only if there is a substantiated knowledge, can be implemented in practice.'
Although the entity agrees that a legal framework is needed, it has reservations in relation to due diligence duty definition proposed by the consultation and advocates for reducing the scope of due diligence to the immediate supplier level
The entity agrees that a requirement (legal framework) is needed, including an horizontal minimum process and definitions approach. Regarding due diligence duty definition (question 14), it states that 'We find this definition not precise enough. Any definition on due diligence must be in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. (…) Furthermore, the UNGP (UN GP, commentary, section 3) are clear that “where adverse impacts have occurred that the business enterprise has not caused or contributed to, but which are directly linked to its operations, products or services by a business relationship, the responsibility to respect human rights does not require that the enterprise itself provide for remediation…” The notion on “cause/ contribute/ directly linked” should be taken into account. (…) A regulation beyond the immediate supplier level seems not implementable'.
The entity opposes extending responsibility beyond company capacity or span of control, which in practice seems to refer to direct suppliers
The entity states that 'The obligation to respect and observe human rights is enshrined in all major certification standards. In particular, companies that are not, or cannot be, active locally at the place of origin must be able to rely on this'. It also indicates that 'In many cases it must be sufficient for the food manufacturer to contractually obligate its suppliers of raw materials or processed raw materials to meet the requirements of compliance with human rights due diligence. Otherwise the sourcing of raw materials, especially for medium-sized companies, will not be manageable in practice'.
Require that companies implement contract clauses and Code of Conduct with business partners clarifying obligations to avoid and to address human rights harms.
The entity supports contractual assurances with suppliers as a way to meet due diligence obligations.
The entity states that 'it must be ensured that companies shall be deemed to have already fulfilled their obligations under the UN Guiding Principles, if they contractually oblige their upstream suppliers to comply with human rights due diligence and respond accordingly when breaches become known'. However, This is presented as a substitute measure, not complementary.
Require that companies identify their stakeholders and their interests.
The entity strongly disagrees with a legal requirement of stakeholder identification.
The entity strongly disagrees with question 6 about a requirement (for directors) to identify stakeholders and their interests. It states that 'It is superfluous to legally prescribe the perception of company interests, the company does this in its own interest ... Moreover, it is not reasonable to believe that companies can carry out an exhaustive overview of all their stakeholders’ interests. There is no definition behind “stakeholders” and no reasonable definition can be found due to the specificity of each company's environment. We strongly believe that any legal consequences attached to this notion would be highly problematic and hazardous for companies'.
Require directors to establish and apply mechanisms or, where they already exist for employees for example, use existing information and consultation channels for engaging with stakeholders.
The Company strongly disagrees with directors being required to establish channels for engaging with stakeholders in due diligence duty.
It strongly disagrees with a requirement (for directors) to establish mechanisms for stakeholder consultation as part of due diligence duty. It states that '‘There exists already EU-regulation on the information and consultation of workers. Further new regulations are not needed. We recognise that consultation of relevant stakeholders is important in the life of companies, but it should be up to the company itself to define which stakeholders are relevant. Companies already organise the dialogue with their stakeholders using different mechanisms that are suitable to the intended goals (…) Also, new legal requirements risk destabilising or duplicating existing effective provisions. Involvement/ consultation/ information to relevant stakeholders is important, but should be determined by the company, depending on its specificities. Legally mandated mechanisms could lead to either meaningless box-ticking exercises or to conflicting situations (between different stakeholders’ interests) that would reduce efficiency of decision-making processes in companies and harm their competitiveness’.
Require that corporate directors should manage the human rights risks for the company in relation to stakeholders and their interest including on the long run.
The entity strongly disagrees with a legal requirement for directors to manage the risks of the company in relation to stakeholders and their interests.
The entity strongly disagrees with question 6 about a requirement (for directors) of management of the risks for the company in relation to stakeholders and their interests. It states that 'It is superfluous to legally prescribe the perception of company interests, the company does this in its own interest. Directors’ duties cannot be put on a checklist formula as suggested by the previous two questions but through broad principles that provide flexibility for the company to identify in the present and in the long term which of the stakeholder interests it should consider in accordance with its activity, structure, nature and size. Moreover, it is not reasonable to believe that companies can carry out an exhaustive overview of all their stakeholders’ interests. There is no definition behind “stakeholders” and no reasonable definition can be found due to the specificity of each company's environment. We strongly believe that any legal consequences attached to this notion would be highly problematic and hazardous for companies'.
Require companies to set requirements relevant to the prevention of forced or compulsory labour applicable to all workers and all sectors of the economy.
The entity proposes a tiered due diligence model for SMEs/SMCs based on the Commission's risk database and OECD guidance, but proposes that completing a prequalification process fully discharges SME obligations
The entity states that 'We propose that SMEs are given the opportunity to fulfil their due diligence obligations via a robust prequalification process … The Commission should clarify what a satisfactory prequalification process will look like. If the pre-qualification process is successfully completed, the SME is deemed to have fulfilled its due diligence obligations under the EUFLR'.
The Entity welcomes the legislation initiative, calling for coherence with CSDDD without attempting to limit the scope or definitions of the regulation
The entity states that 'The BDSI welcomes the European initiative to ban forced labour products. It must be coherent with the proposal for a European Due Diligence Directive and must not lead to companies’ withdrawal from certain supply chains and countries. As a “smart mix”, the initiative should include various development instruments, such as partnership agreements with producer countries or tariff preferences. '
Require companies to support labour inspection services and other services responsible for the implementation of legislation aimed at abolition of forced or compulsory labour.
The entity calls for a threshold, invoking a substantiated-concern standard, which could raise the bar, deterring allegations, although it also calls for an early warning system database.
"The guidelines need to specify what degree of linkage between alleged forced-labour practices and products placed on or exported from the EU market the submitted allegation (Article 9) needs to show in order to trigger the preliminary phase of the investigation. Evidence submitted ... should be credible and based on independent, verifiable information demonstrating a plausible link, consistent with the Regulation's substantiated-concern threshold." / "We urge the Commission to extend the above-mentioned database or to create a new database where it admits and compiles information such as NGO reports, input from academia, press releases ... called an Early Warning System."
Require companies to promote and support initiatives that identify, protect, recover, rehabilitate, and empower victims and those at risk, regardless of their presence and legal status, including through access to remedy.
The entity states that SMEs cannot be expected to engage in remediation in origin countries due to resource constraints, and proposes an exit mechanism for SMCs that allows them to stop remediation efforts after notifying authorities.
The entity points out that 'SMEs’ resource constrains prevent them from engaging with and initiating remediation in the origin countries.' 'After a certain period, SMCs should review the implemented measures and in case no progress is made notify the competent authority of the Member state of the steps they have taken but should not be expected to continue.'
Implementing an enforcement mechanism where companies fail to implement measures to combat forced labour.
Specific call to not reverse the burden of proof to the detriment of companies, calling for it to remain with competent authorities.
The entity claims that 'The burden of proof must not be reversed, to the detriment of companies, that a product is forcibly free from work. The conditions for a ban on imports must be clearly and legally certain. If information on the actual existence of forced labour is unclear, it should be considered as part of companies’ due diligence obligations as part of their risk management.'
| Legislation | Position |
|---|---|
| EU CSDDD | Not Supporting |
| EU FLR | Not Supporting |
| Member | Performance band |
|---|---|
| Mars Wrigley | C+ |
| Ferrero | C |